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Preface
Numerical Studies on Paradoxes in Noncooperative Distributed Com-
puter Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1–16
S.F. El-Zoghdy, H. Kameda, J. Li
Abstract
The exponential growth of distributed computer systems (computer networks)
demands massive upgrades of capacity in existing systems. Traditional capacity de-
sign methodologies, developed with the single-class networking paradigm in mind,
overlook the noncooperative structure of modern networks. Consequently, such de-
sign approaches entail the danger of degraded performance when resources are added
to a network, a phenomenon known as the Braess Paradox. Numerical examples of
a Braess-like paradox in which adding capacity to a distributed computer system
may degrade the performance of all users in the system have been reported. Unlike
the original Braess Paradox, in the models examined, this behavior occurs only in
the case of finitely many users and not in the case of infinite number of users, and
the degree of performance degradation can increase without bound.
This study examines numerically, some examples around the Braess-like para-
dox. From the numerical examples, it is observed that, in the class optimum, the
worst-case degree of the paradox is largest (i.e., the worst performance is obtained)
in the complete symmetry case with the arrival rate being closest to the processing
rate. And, as the system parameter setting gradually departs the above-mentioned
symmetric case without keeping any kind of symmetries, the worst-case degree of the
paradox decreases rapidly. It decreases slowly (more slowly) if the system param-
eter setting departs the complete symmetry while keeping the individual (overall)
symmetry property. Indeed, it is also observed that in complete symmetry, if the
communication means of type (A)((B)) is used, the worst-case degree of the paradox
converges to a certain limit (may increase without bound) as the arrival rate gets
very close to the processing rate, and it increases as the number of nodes in the
system increases.
On the Borel and von Neumann Poker Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–32
C. Ferguson, T.S. Ferguson
Abstract
Borel and von Neumann two-person zero-sum poker models with independent
uniform (0,1) hands are considered. The first two sections describe these Borel
and von Neumann and problems with their application in real poker games. Most
subsequent work on these models has been to extend the Borel model to allow
several rounds of betting or more bet sizes. The von Neumann model, though more
closely tied to actual play, is harder to treat mathematically. In this paper we solve
several extensions to the von Neumann model. It is generally assumed that players’
”hands” are independent random variable, but we weaken this assumption because
dealing with finite desk gives the information about opponent’s ”hand”. First, we
consider the poker model with in independent not identically distributed ”hands”.
Second, negatively dependent distributions of players’ ”hands” are examined for
the model. The von Neumann model was extended on the case of non-identically
distributed ”hands” weakening one assumption about the distributions. The model
of poker von Neumann game with dependent ”hands” is represented.
Axiomatic Characterization of Boolean Vote Aggregators . . . . . . . . 33–43
S. Lahiri
Abstract
In this paper a model for the aggregation of Boolean ballot profiles is consid-
ered. In this framework we obtain axiomatic characterizations of the majority vote
aggregator and the two single valued selections from it. It is also shown in this
paper that the unique property which is necessary and sufficient for a Federation
Boolean Vote Aggregator to be a Weighted Boolean Vote Aggregator is a property
called robustness.
N–Person Best-Choice Game with Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45–53
V.V. Mazalov, M.V. Banin
Abstract
We consider here n-person time-sequential game related with the best-choice
problem. The game consists of at the most k steps. In k-step i-player receives an
offer x
(k)
i . We suppose that x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2 , ..., x
(k)
n are independent random variables. As
the collection of the offers comes up, players must decide whether to accept it or
reject it expecting that a more favorable solution may come up in the near future.
After all players make a choice then we calculate the number of players who choose
whether to ”accept” or ”reject” their offers respectively. If the number of players
choosing ”reject” is greater or equal to the number of players choosing ”accept”
the game continues and the players move to k − 1 step. Otherwise, the game stops
and each of the players receives the corresponding offer x(k). The process continues
until either more than half of players accept their offers or until the step k = 0 takes
place where all players receive nothing. Each player is interested to maximize his
expected payoff.
A Fishery Game Model with Age-Distributed Population: Reserved Ter-
ritory Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55–70
V.V. Mazalov, A.N. Rettieva
Abstract
Game-theoretic models related to a bioresource management problem (fish catch-
ing) are investigated. The players (countries or fishing firms) which harvest the fish
stock are the participants of the game. The center (state) determines the reserved
portion of the reservoir (where fishing is prohibited). In traditional statement the
center’s objective is catch regulation by introduction quotas. In this paper the cen-
ter’s task is to determine the optimal reserved portion of the reservoir to maintain
stable population development. The models, which allows the existence of more
that one age class of fish in the reservoir, are investigated. The Nash equilibrium
and bargaining solutions are obtained.
The Effects of Incomplete Information in Stochastic Common–Stock Har-
vesting Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71–100
R. McKelvey, P.V. Golubtsov
Abstract
The dynamic fishery harvesting game is generalized to a stochastic environment,
in order to examine the implications of incomplete and asymmetric information. The
main emphasis is on a split-stream version of the game: At the beginning of each
harvest season the initial fish stock divides into two streams, each one accessible to
harvest by just one of the two competing fishing fleets. The fleets simultaneously
harvest down their streams. After harvest, the residual sub-stocks reunite, to form
the brood stock for the subsequent generation. In this cyclic process, natural envi-
ronmental factors will incorporate Markovian stochastic elements. At the beginning
of each season, the fleets both know current recruitment, and also have some (gener-
ally incomplete or delayed, and often asymmetric) knowledge of the current values
of stochastic elements. In the dynamic game each fleet sets its harvest policy, with
the objective of maximizing the expected discounted sum of seasonal payoffs, and
conditional on the extent of its current knowledge, and of the anticipated policy of
its competitor. The implications of alternative knowledge-structures are explored,
through dynamic programming and simulation. Particular focus is on demonstrat-
ing the often unexpected, and sometimes counter-intuitive, effects that knowledge
enrichment may have, in these incomplete-information, common-property games.
Two–level Imitative Problems in Stock Markets and Bayesian Estimation
of Credibility Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101–112
F. Mignanego, S. Mulinacci
Abstract
Leader-follower games could be a good framework to model some economic prob-
lems arising when agents want to imitate each other, because some of them are
better informed than the others. A two-level stock market imitative problem with
two leaders (well informed) and one follower is considered. The follower wants to
imitate one or both leaders, maximizing his own payoff. The purposes of the paper
is to show the relationship between the optimal solutions of three players and to
estimate parameters to have a measure of the credibility of followers strategy for
the given behavior of the other two players. This measure could be also interpreted
as parameter estimating the reputation of the two leaders. The follower can give
different weights to different types of leaders’ behavior, then observations and, as
a consequence, the estimation of the parameters, are necessary to budget his be-
havior. In financial applications, interactions among gents are repeated more times
if interaction is profitable. This leads to considering a dynamic problem. In this
way, if the follower has a good estimation of credibility parameters, with respect
to leaders’ behavior, a good level of credibility guarantees the dynamicity of the
hierarchic game model. The dynamics is represented by repetitions of the static
game in different time-intervals.
On Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games of
apital Accumulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113–124
A.S. Nowak, P. Szajowski
Abstract
The paper examines two-person nonzero-sum stochastic games of capital accu-
mulation. It is proved that every two-person nonzero-sum infinite horizon stochastic
game of capital accumulation has a nonrandomized stationary Nash equilibrium un-
der a certain assumption on the transition probability function. The approach taken
in this paper is not based on a fixed point argument. The authors construct a se-
quence of Nash equilibria in the finite horizon games such that the corresponding
equilibrium payoff functions are convergent. It turns out that the limits are the
equilibrium payoff functions for the infinite horizon discounted stochastic game. It
is also shown that a stationary Nash equilibrium pair exists in the infinite horizon
model.
Cooperative Solution for Games with Random Duration . . . . . 125–139
L.A. Petrosjan, E.V. Shevkoplyas
Abstract
Time-consistency and strongly time-consistency problems for cooperative differ-
ential n-person games with random duration are considered. It is proved, that in
many cases the solution (or optimality principle) for such games is time-inconsistent.
For regularization of solution the special imputation distributed procedure (IDP)
is introduced and the (strongly) time-consistency of the new regularized optimality
principle proved. The example of 3-person differential game with random duration
is investigated and the regularized Shapley Value (RSV) computed in analytic form.
Best–choice Games where Arbitration Comes in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141-149
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
We first consider a simple n–round poker. Each of two players I and II receives
a hand x and y, respectively, in [0, 1], according to a uniform distribution, and
chooses one of two alternatives Reject or Accept. If choice–pair is R–R, the game
proceeds to the next round and both players are dealt new hands x and y. If the
chice–pair is A–A showdown occurs and the game ends with I’s reward sgn(x−y). If
players choose different choices, then arbitration comes in, and forces them to take
the same choices as I’s (II’s) with probability p (p¯). This zero–sum game is played
in n–rounds, and player I(II) aims to maximize(minimize) the expected reward to
I.
A ”Quantitative” Minimax Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151–155
M.V. Stefanescu, M. Ferrara
Abstract
The main result of the paper establishes the minimax equality under quantitative-
type conditions. One extends the Fan-Ko˝nig minimax theorem avoiding topological
assumptions.
On Bruss’ Stopping Problem with General Gain Function . . . . 157–167
A. Suchwa lko, K. Szajowski
Abstract
Bruss (1987) studied a continuous-time generalization of the secretary problem.
In this paper we investigate optimal strategies for two versions of Bruss’ problem.
In these modifications we use different goal functions. In Section 2 we analyze a case
when the objective is stop on the best or on the second best object (apartment).
In Section 3 the aim is to stop on the second best object. We give the optimal
strategies and the value (probability of success) of the optimal strategy for both
cases.
Semi-Definite Programming Approach for Bandwidth Allocation and Rout-
ing in Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169–179
C. Touati, E. Altman and J. Galtier
Abstract
We consider the problem of assigning bandwidth to calls which have minimum
bandwidth requirements. We provide a general computational tool for joint routing
as well as bandwidth allocations in networks which is based on Semi-Definite Pro-
gramming (SDP). The advantage of our approach is that many appealing complex
objective functions that appear in network optimization problems (especially those
related to fair bandwidth allocation problems) are shown to be special cases of our
formalism, and such optimization problems can be solved in an automatic manner
whenever a standart SDP software package is available to the network manager.
Our approach produces the solutions to the two problems stated, of bandwidth al-
location for ATM and for Internet networks. The paper concludes with a select
number of numerical illustrations of the behaviour of the optimal solution in terms
of fairness.
Cournot Equilibrium and Competition via Supply Functions . 181–191
A. Vasin, N. Durakovich and P. Vasina
Abstract
The paper considers the Cournot oligopoly with heterogeneous producers. For
a demand function with the non-decreasing elasticity, we establish the existence of
the unique Nash equilibrium and evaluate the deviation of the Nash equilibrium
outcome from the Walrasian outcome. We study also a model of the sealed bid
auction and show that any Nash equilibrium price lies between the Walrasian price
and the Cournot price. We discuss application of these results to electricity markets.
Some Results on Convergence of Learning Algorithms for Games on Net-
works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193–197
S.V. Vinnichenko
Abstract
We consider the following problem (M.A. Sukhotina and L. A. Petrosyan):
(Learning procedure A.) Let G = (X,Γ) be an arbitrary network, where X is the
set of nodes (players). Each player repeatedly plays with his neighbours the same
mxm bimatrix symmetric game with the payoff matrix (αij , βij)
where αij = βji . By K = {1, 2, . . . ,m} denote the set of strategies. At the first
stage of the game the players use initial strategies L1 = {lx1}. Suppose a player x
uses a strategy i and a set of strategies of his neighbours is J. Choose j ∈ J such
that βij has the maximal value. At the following stage of the game the player x uses
the strategy j if αij < βij or keeps the strategy i in the opposite case. All players
change their strategies by this way. Assume that all αij are pairwise distinct for the
unambiguousness of the algorithm.
Thus we have the sequence of Lk = {lxk}. We say that the learning procedure
A converges if there exists a k′ such that Lk = Lk′ for k ≥ k′. The problem is to
study when the convergence takes place.
In the sequel we obtain some sufficient conditions for the convergence of this
procedure on a finite network, on a finite linear network, on a finite tree, and on an
arbitrary network.
Endogenous-Horizon Randomly Furcating Differential Games . 199–217
D.W.K. Yeung
Abstract
This paper widens the scope of endogenous-horizon differential games by intro-
ducing uncertainty into the model along the line of the work of Yeung (2001 and
2003). In particular, we propose a new class of games - designated as endogenous-
horizon randomly furcating stochastic differential games. The analysis allows ran-
dom shocks to appear in the players’ future payoffs. Since these payoffs are uncer-
tain, the term “randomly furcating” is introduced to emphasize that a useful way
to analyze such situations is to assume that payoffs change at any instant of time
according to known probability distributions defined in terms of multiple-branching
stochastic processes.
The Mean Value with Evaluation Measures and a Zero–sum Stopping
Game with Fuzzy Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219–225
Y. Yoshida, M. Yasuda, J. Nakagami and M. Kurano
Abstract
We firstly introduce an evaluation method of fuzzy numbers called the mean
value with evaluation measures. Then, using this notion, a stopping game model
with fuzzy random variables could be formulated. When a sequence of fuzzy-valued
random variables(fuzzy RV) are observed, the important problem is how to treat and
analyze the model. Previously the observed fuzzy RV’s are evaluated by probabilistic
expectation and scalarization functions, that is, λ-weighting functions and fuzzy
measures. Here, as an alternative approach, the mean value with evaluation measure
is discussed. Also the fuzzy RV’s by the stopping times are defined and we apply
it to a zero-sum stopping game with fuzzy values. The saddle points for this fuzzy
stopping games are given under a regularity condition.
A Game Theoretic Model for the Network Service . . . . . . . . . . . 227–234
V.V. Zakharov, V.V. Melnikov
Abstract
The paper studies a problem of sharing a communication link to a common
source by means of non-cooperative game theory. In the considered model, a payoff
to any player is given by a gap payoff function which satisfies specific properties
when total load exceeds some fixed level. This assumption was made to formalize
a border between high grade of service and lower one. It is proposed the suffi-
cient conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium for considered class of games. A
method to calculate Nash equilibrium and to find routing strategies which guarantee
high grade of service is presented. The results are extended to a case of multiple
communication links. In this setting, players may choose multiple links to connect
to the common source. Similar propositions on existence of Nash equilibrium are
provided.
Imputations in Cooperative Games under Uncertainty . . . . . . . 235–259
V.I. Zhukovskiy, V.S. Molostvov, S.N. Sachkov and L.V. Smirnova
Abstract
Valuable contribution to development of cooperative games theory was made,
however, but it was not taken in account the perturbations, noises and other types
of uncertainties. The only thing known about these uncertainties is the range of
changes but any statistical characteristics are usually absent. Such uncertainties
arise in many economic problems. These uncertainties may be changes of the de-
mand for the produced goods, changes of quantity and nomenclature of the suppliers,
breakage and replacement of an equipment, unexpected appearance of competitors,
natural phenomena, etc. It is natural to pass from the multicriteria problems to the
game theoretic problems under uncertainties for choosing optimal strategies taking
in account these uncertainties. The authors consider three player cooperative games
and investigate only the imputations. The paper consists of two sections. The first
section is devoted to the cooperative games under uncertainty and without side pay-
ments. In the second section the same games but with side payments are considered.
Each section includes two parts, one of which deals with ”pure” uncertainties and
the other one deals with ”informed” uncertainties.
